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Abstract
We present a short history of the TAUVEX instru-
ment, conceived to provide multi-band wide-field imag-
ing in the ultraviolet, emphasizing the lack of suffi-
cient and aggressive support on the part of the differ-
ent space agencies that dealt with this basic science
mission. First conceived in 1985 and selected by the
Israel Space Agency in 1989 as its first priority pay-
load, TAUVEX is fast becoming one of the longest-
living space project of space astronomy. After being
denied a launch on a national Israeli satellite, and then
not flying on the Spectrum X-Gamma (SRG) interna-
tional observatory, it was manifested since 2003 as part
of ISRO’s GSAT-4 Indian satellite to be launched in the
late 2000s. However, two months before the launch, in
February 2010, it was dismounted from its agreed-upon
platform. This proved to be beneficial, since GSAT-4
and its launcher were lost on April 15 2010 due to the
failure of the carrier rocket’s 3rd stage. TAUVEX is
now stored in ISRO’s clean room in Bangalore with no
firm indications when or on what platform it might be
launched.
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1 Introduction
The Israel Space Agency (ISA) issued a call for pre-
proposals in 1988 for “scientific experiments to be flown
on an Israeli satellite”. The call was answered by ap-
proximately 50 pre-proposals ranging from space as-
tronomy experiments, to characterizing the behavior of
electronic devices in the space environment, to the be-
havior of fishes in zero-g. All the pre-proposals were
evaluated by an internal ISA panel and two were se-
lected and funded to submit Phase A proposals. Among
these, the one from Tel Aviv University proposed to or-
bit two small telescopes to provide relatively wide-field
imaging in the space-ultraviolet (UV) domain.
The subsequent submission stage at the completion
of the Phase A, performed together with a commercial
contractor (El-Op Electro-Optical Industries now part
of the ELBIT Systems company), produced a detailed
study of the mission. El-Op was selected as Prime Con-
tractor since it had a strong heritage of sophisticated
electro-optical payloads for ground, naval, and airborne
imaging while developing substantial infrastructure for
space imaging payloads. In particular, it operated a
thermal-vacuum chamber equipped with a collimator
that allowed a payload to be end-to-end tested in vac-
uum and at extreme temperatures.
The TAUVEX Phase A result was a design summa-
rized in Table 1, with three 20-cm co-aligned telescopes
mounted within a cylinder that could fit the inner space
of an OFEQ-class satellite. The field of view (FOV) of
each telescope was chosen to be approximately one de-
gree. Erring on the conservative side, we decided to use
only space-proven techniques and components, and to
require the Prime Contractor to include fully-redundant
systems in this first national astronomy experiment.
For UV detectors we selected sealed photoelectric detec-
tors with Caesium Telluride semi-transparent cathodes
equipped with multi-channel plate (MCP) intensifiers
2and wedge-and-strip anodes, as used in previous exper-
iments (e.g., FAUST: Bowyer et al. 1993). At this time
we decided to name the experiment TAUVEX, for Tel
Aviv University UV EXperiment. The science to be
performed by TAUVEX, as proposed to ISA, was to
survey a large fraction of the sky in the UV to depths
vastly superior to those achieved by the UV surveys in
the 1970s.
The science goals of the TAUVEX mission were de-
fined as providing galaxy imaging in a number of bands
to allow studies of star formation processes, allowing
the detection and identification of AGNs by selections
based on color indices, and collecting unique stellar
photometry data for stellar populations and interstellar
extinction studies. These goals were discussed by e.g.,
Brosch & Almoznino (2007), Joshi et al. (2007), Net-
zer (2007), Shastri (2007), and Maheswar et al. (2007).
They were derived from the projected capabilities of
TAUVEX given the properties listed by Brosch (1998)
and subsequent modifications. Of special importance
for the study of galaxies in the nearby Universe and
of the stellar and interstellar matter of the Milky Way
we mention the inclusion of two filters centered on the
2174Å feature; photometric measurements through a
wide and a narrow band filter allow the measurement
of the equivalent width of this feature.
The TAUVEX Phase A report was submitted to the
scrutiny of two evaluation committees: one technical,
composed of Israeli technology experts to evaluate its
feasibility, and the other scientific, composed of well-
known international experts in the UV astronomy field
to evaluate its scientific contribution and expected im-
pact. The second selected proposal, submitted by the
Technion, Israel’s technological university, was evalu-
ated at the same time; it proposed orbiting a small
X-ray telescope.
The two evaluations proceeded in parallel and the
conclusion was that ISA selected TAUVEX as the pay-
load with the highest priority to launch. At this point,
when the development, construction and launch of
TAUVEX were expected to follow smoothly, ISA found
that the national satellite and launcher on which it was
counting to mount TAUVEX became unavailable. The
reason, which became clear only in 2009, was that ISA
originally planned to launch TAUVEX on the qualifi-
cation model (QM) of one of the OFEQ-series satellite,
the first three-axis-stabilized Israeli satellites used for
imaging intelligence. The QM would have been refur-
bished and used to launch and operate TAUVEX which,
as already described, was originally designed to fit the
inner volume of the satellite.
However, with the loss at launch of one of the OFEQ
satellites, practical necessities dictated the use of the
satellite and launcher to orbit a different payload. With
the disappearance of the satellite and launcher intended
for pure scientific research, ISA announced that it could
only provide funding for the development of the scien-
tific instrument and that the science team should look
for a platform on which TAUVEX could be flown.
2 An alternative launch: SRG
With the help of international colleagues, the Spectrum
X-γ (SRG) spacecraft was identified as a possible car-
rier platform for TAUVEX. SRG was designed as a large
high-energy astrophysics platform, one of the three ma-
jor observatories in the Spectrum series, together with
Spectrum RadioAstron and Spectrum-UV. The space-
craft was to be provided by the Soviet Union and con-
structed at the Lavotchkin Space Industries in Khimky
(near Moscow), with most of its scientific instruments
on-board to be supplied by different European coun-
tries. Originally, SRG was to be launched by a Proton
rocket into a highly elliptical, four-day Molnyia-type
orbit.
The largest instrument on-board SRG was the
Danish-led SODART X-ray telescope with two 60-cm
nested-cones concentrators for the ∼0.3-10 keV range
(Schnopper 1990). SODART was to provide X-ray
imaging over a ∼one degree FOV with arcmin angu-
lar resolution and excellent sensitivity, given its large-
throughput optics. SRG included also soft X-ray to
extreme UV imagers from Switzerland, another X-ray
imager from the UK, a hard X-ray imager from Italy,
etc.
The inclusion of TAUVEX among the SRG instru-
ments was intended to provide simultaneous UV infor-
mation with which the X-ray observations could be cor-
related, much in the manner of XMM’s Optical/UV
monitor. An additional task imposed on TAUVEX by
the mission leaders was to aid the SRG fine guidance
system in stabilizing the telescopes’ LOS. This was to
be done by providing fine guiding corrections to the
SRG systems every two seconds; these corrections were
derived from centroiding a relatively bright star in the
TAUVEX FOV and measuring displacements from an
initial position. Calculations showed that with the ex-
pected sensitivity TAUVEX could provide such stabi-
lization signals all over the sky if it would have been
used with no filter, or with a very wide blue-cutoff filter
dubbed “broad-band filter” (BBF). Since this “guiding”
task was deemed to be vital for SRG, the satellite Prin-
cipal Investigator required TAUVEX to be equipped
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Table 1 TAUVEX details
Property Description
Number of telescopes 3
Aperture (individual telescope) 20-cm
Optical design Ritchey-Chrétien
Operating spectral range 120-320 nm
Filter wheels four-position
Detector Wedge-and-strip (CsTe2; Peak QE≃10%); photon-counting
Field of view 56 arcmin
Electronic pixel size 3 arcsec
Angular resolution 6-11 arcsec (wavelength dependent)
Calculated sensitivity (SRG) ∼20 mag (monochromatic) in 1h integration
Calculated sensitivity (GSAT-4) ∼19 mag (monochromatic) while scanning the NPC
Note: NPC=North Polar Cap: 90◦ ≤ δ ≤ 80◦
with a BBF filter in every telescope of the three it car-
ried, albeit its scientific value was not expected to be
significant.
The configuration of three telescopes within a cylin-
der, conceived for an OFEQ launch, could not be
maintained with TAUVEX mounted on top of SO-
DART at the space end of SRG. For this reason, the
planned cylindrical configuration was “unwrapped” and
the three telescopes were designed to be almost copla-
nar. The payload was designed to fit into two units: an
optical unit (OU) consisting of the mirrors, detectors,
filter assemblies, and pre-amplifier boards, and an elec-
tronic unit (EU) consisting of the power conditioning
unit, analog-to-digital front ends, high-voltage power
supplies, doubly-redundant CPUs, on-board memory in
the form of four 84 MB laptop hard disks in pressur-
ized enclosures, etc. This configuration was described
by Topaz et al. (1993), Schnopper (1994), Brosch et al.
(1994), and Leibowitz (1995).
ISA and Israel’s minister of Science and Technology
(at that time the late Prof. Yuval Ne’eman) issued by
the end of 1991 a letter to Prof. Rashid Sunyaev the
SRG Principal Investigator promising to deliver TAU-
VEX to the SRG spacecraft on time, according to the
satellite schedule. At this time, the plan was to launch
SRG by 1994. With the commitment to launch on SRG,
a contract was signed between ISA and the Ministry of
Science and Technology on the one hand, and El-Op on
the other hand, to provide the TAUVEX payload ac-
cording to previously agreed-upon specifications. The
investigator team at Tel Aviv University was to provide
an advisory role in the project, with the final decisions
to be taken by ISA.
Given the short time table, the design of TAUVEX
and its construction were performed in record time by
El-Op, and the project never missed any SRG mile-
stone. This included the delivery of size and mass mod-
els and of a thermal model (TM), identical in shape to
the flight model (FM) but equipped with many sensors
so that it could fully simulate the behavior of TAUVEX
in space conditions. Prior to its delivery to Lavotchkin,
the TAUVEX TM undertook a full space simulation
at the iABG facility in Germany, where a thermal-
vacuum chamber equipped with a solar simulator was
used. Note also that the pressure to launch in time
required the assembly of the flight OU to take place
already in 1993, with detectors fabricated in 1992.
However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought
about financial difficulties in Russia which inherited
most of the Soviet space programs. In particular, SRG
suffered continuous delays and caused additional costs
to the TAUVEX project. Parenthetically, note that
SRG has not yet been launched by 2010, although it is
still manifested as a Russian Space Agency (RKA) mis-
sion albeit with a different set of instruments. Given
the interminable delays, and the uncertainty that SRG
would ever launch, ISA instructed the TAUVEX science
team in 2000 to search for an alternate launch possi-
bility. A launch alternative was possible since TAU-
VEX was designed from the outset to require only me-
chanical fixation points, electrical power supply and up-
link/downlink telemetry from any platform it would be
attached to.
3 Looking for an alternative launch: GSAT-4
The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) issued
in 2000 a call for proposals to perform scientific exper-
iments on its future GSAT-4 satellite. GSAT-4 was in-
tended to be a technological demonstrator satellite for
the next generation Indian telecommunications satel-
lites testing, in particular, the “bent-pipe” transponder
techniques and carrying a navigational payload. With
4apparently a large mass margin and intended to go into
geosynchronous orbit (GO), GSAT-4 appeared to be a
good carrier candidate for TAUVEX.
Discussions with the ISRO officials, and with the sci-
entists at the Indian Institute of Astrophysics (IIA), re-
sulted in identification of some necessary modifications
to the SRG version of TAUVEX. In particular, since
a telecom satellite in GEO must maintain a fixed ori-
entation with respect to the Earth to keep its beams
on the intended ground station, this required mount-
ing TAUVEX on a rotating plate (MDP) able to aim
the TAUVEX LOS to any declination on the celestial
sphere. The ISRO engineers decided that they could
realize this by mounting the MDP on a solar panel mo-
tor while routing the electrical lines through the motor
spindle.
The advantage of having TAUVEX on a GEO plat-
form is, obviously, the reduction of radiation pickup
while going through the South Atlantic Anomaly or the
inner radiation belts. This would have happened every
four-day orbit in the first year of SRG operation. An-
other advantage of operation on-board a GEO telecom
satellite is the availability, in principle, of continuous
high-volume communications. The ISRO engineers re-
alized this by modulating the GSAT-4 beacon; TAU-
VEX could thus enjoy continuous scientific telemetry
at 1 Mbps without accessing any of the on-board ex-
perimental transponders.
After identifying the developments required for
TAUVEX, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
was signed between ISRO and ISA on December 25
2003. The MOU stipulated specifically that TAUVEX
will be launched on GSAT-4 and the signatories were
the then heads of agencies: Sri Madhavan Nair for ISRO
and Mr. Aby Har Even for ISA. The ceremony took
place in Bangalore and was witnessed by Israel’s Minis-
ter of Science and Technology (at that time, Mr. Eliezer
Sandberg).
Following the MOU signing, TAUVEX was re-
evaluated in 2005 by ISA and El-Op as to its readi-
ness for flight. Since the FM OU had been assembled
already almost a decade earlier, there was no way to
test all its individual components. Instead, we relied on
checking the response of the detectors to light and mea-
suring the shape of the spectral response curves against
the same curves provided by the detector manufacturer
(DEP=Delft Electronische Producten in Roden, the
Netherlands). We checked the filters separately by ex-
tracting the filter wheels from the OM. The transmis-
sion profiles checked out almost exactly as measured by
the manufacturer and the detector outputs followed the
spectral shapes produced by DEP more than a decade
earlier. Similar results were obtained for the detec-
tor dark noise and hot pixels, concluding that both
detectors and filters were flyable at their nominal per-
formances.
We could not check the reflectivity of the mirrors
since this would have required an end-to-end test,
planned for the final testing and calibration, immedi-
ately prior to shipping TAUVEX to ISRO. Originally,
El-Op was required to install witness pieces of the mir-
rors and contamination-monitoring germanium disks
within TAUVEX; these were, however, not installed at
any time after the FM’s optical unit was assembled, pre-
cluding the possibility of checking for possible contam-
ination or mirror coating degradation. The cleanliness
of the FM OU was checked by MMG Sorek specialists,
who performed the original environmental conditions
evaluations (Noter et al. 1993, Nahor et al. 1993, Lif-
shitz et al. 1994). This was done by obtaining dry
or wet “smears” from the stray light shield (inside and
outside), from the mirror bezel, and from other external
parts of TAUVEX. These revealed only minor contam-
ination levels and, as a conclusion, predicted that the
UV performance in space would be the nominal one.
4 Modifications for GSAT-4
Changing from a stabilized pointing mode to one in
which the telescopes rotate about the Earth necessi-
tated changes in the data handling system. In the
SRG configuration, the hard disk memories had only
to record images (with 1000×1000 pixel resolution, one
for each telescope) for each observation period. In the
new geosynchronous orbit, each photon event had to
be recorded with its coordinates on the detector plane
and exact time. Knowing the pointing angle at that
time, an image could later be reconstructed from all the
recorded events. With a launch scheduled for 2004 or
later, it made sense also to renew many of the elements
in the FM EU so as to enhance the payload reliabil-
ity. For instance, the four 84-MB hard disks used as
on-board storage for the SRG version were replaced by
2×4 GB solid-state memories to provide a buffer storage
for instances when the photon event rate would exceed
the capabilities of the telemetry link. On the hardware
side, since the installation on the MDP allowed a slight
extension of the OU, an external baffle was designed
to fit in front of the old stray light shield. This 10-cm
extension was calculated to reduce further the influence
of extraneous light and reduce the background, at the
expense of a slight mass increase.
Major changes took place in the heat dissipation sys-
tem; this now would be done by dedicated radiators
viewing deep space from next to the apertures of the
additional baffle. The heat was conducted by heat pipes
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embedded in the MDP via copper ribbons from the OU
detector compartments, and by direct contact with the
bottom of the EU.
The flight software was extensively rewritten, elimi-
nating the significant on-board data processing required
for a flight on SRG. In particular, the image recon-
struction required to reduce the telemetry bandwith on
SRG was no longer needed; instead, it was necessary to
download each photon event, with time tags inserted in
the data stream every 0.128 sec.
5 Possible problems: uncertain ground testing
and calibration
In preparation for the first Flight Model integration
session with GSAT-4 (following an integration exer-
cise performed with the TAUVEX Engineering Model),
scheduled for the second half of 2008 for a launch sched-
uled for early-2009, we performed the acceptance tests
and the final ground calibrations of the TAUVEX FM
at the El-Op facilities in spring 2008. The procedures
and the derived results were described in detail by Al-
moznino et al. (2009).
Briefly, we found that while TAUVEX complied with
most of the requirements as defined in the “System
Specifications” document, which is part of the contract
between ISA and El-Op, there were a number of prop-
erties where the results deviated significantly from the
desired performance.
The most disturbing finding was that the overall
throughput seemed to be only 10-20% of the nominal
one and is demonstrated by the two plots in Fig. 1.
The nominal throughput was calculated assuming two
mirror reflections at 85%, five transmissive surfaces at
98%, filter transmissions as measured, and the typi-
cal cathode quantum efficiency following DEP. This re-
duced throughput result was, however, highly uncertain
because the testing equipment at El-Op was not UV-
optimized. For instance, the thermal vacuum chamber
collimator was coated for the visible spectral range and
its mirror coatings had not been checked for reflectivity
for more than a decade. Because of this and of the nu-
merous intermediate calibration stages required to per-
form the entire process, we estimated the uncertainties
in the throughput reduction factor to be close to 100%
for some of the far-UV bands (see also Almoznino et al.
2009). Such large uncertainties allowed, in principle,
also for nominal performance, though the more likely
results were lower than nominal.
The conclusion that the throughput was probably
lower than expected was strengthened by the findings
of the stray light rejection calibration. Although per-
formed only at 20, 40 and 50◦ away from the LOS
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Fig. 1.— Upper panel: Measured response of the TAU-
VEX FM telescopes in the different bands, expressed
as “effective area” in cm2. The filters color-coded and
are labeled on the lower plot. Lower panel: Expected
response of the generic TAUVEX telescopes in the dif-
ferent bands, calculated on the basis of individual com-
ponent characteristics.
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Sun at least 90◦ from the LOS, the values obtained
during the calibration were almost two orders of mag-
nitude lower than those theoretically calculated. Since
miracles hardly happen, we concluded that we might
indeed have a case of lowered overall sensitivity. As the
acceptance criterion for overall throughput called for
at least 90% of the nominal, the implication was that
TAUVEX failed its acceptance test.
The explanation offered by the El-Op technical team
concerning the loss in system sensitivity pointed to the
telescope mirrors as likely culprits. These were coated
by evaporated films of aluminum and magnesium flu-
oride to protect the aluminum. It is possible that the
humidity at which these mirrors were kept for 15 years,
∼50% in the clean room of El-Op, caused the deterio-
ration of the MgF2 protective film and this allowed the
diffusion of air contaminants, perhaps oxygen molecules
or other compounds, to the aluminum layer that lost
part of its reflecting capability. This explanation is sup-
ported by the findings of Ferna´ndez-Perea et al. (2006)
who showed that the degradation of an Al+MgF2 com-
bination exposed to N2, O2, or H2O was mostly due to
the water molecules; these affect also the transmittance
of the MgF2 protective layer.
While the original TAUVEX sensitivity was designed
and expected to yield photometry accurate to 0.1 mag
or better for sources brighter than ∼20 mag (Vega sys-
tem) in the UV for an integration of ∼200 sec, that is,
a single pass through the detector along its diameter,
the new results indicated this level of accuracy could be
achieved only for UV sources brighter than 17-18 mag.
The possible remedy, of recoating the mirrors then re-
assembling TAUVEX and re-calibrating, was deemed
not to be feasible given the high costs and the sched-
ule, which called for a 2009 launch.
The Indian and Israeli science teams resolved to com-
pensate for the possible loss of sensitivity by accumulat-
ing longer on-source integrations, by scanning preferen-
tially regions near the two celestial poles while reducing
the sky area to be covered. At high declinations the
dwell time of a source in the FOV increases as 1/cosδ
with the telescopes scanning at diurnal rate, reaching
a full day of integration at the pole itself. We therefore
devised a program for the first two months of perfor-
mance verification when we would carefully calibrate
TAUVEX as to sensitivity, stray light, etc., essentially
performing an acceptance test using calibrated celes-
tial sources. Following this period, if the throughput
would be found as low as during the ground tests, we
planned to spend most of the time on the North and
South celestial polar caps (|δ| ≥ 80◦), performing a
survey of these areas to the depth of the GALEX MIS
with the suspected reduced sensitivity, or to the level
of the GALEX DIS if the original sensitivity would be
confirmed in-orbit.
6 Integrations with GSAT-4
Various delays at ISRO moved the first integration ex-
ercise of TAUVEX to the end of 2008. The integra-
tion took place at the ISRO clean room facilities in
Bangalore with the different TAUVEX flight units on
a table and the satellite units mounted in the satellite
but connected to TAUVEX via cables that simulated
the on-board telemetry. This allowed a first testing of
the command and scientific telemetry and of the elec-
trical connections to the spacecraft. For this test the
spacecraft power was supplied from UPS devices; at
the second integration the supply was from solar panel
simulators and undesired TAUVEX behaviour was de-
tected as will be described below.
TAUVEX was first tested alone against the test
equipment (EGSE) brought with it from Israel. It was
then connected to the satellite subsystems with the
satellite open and long cables connecting TAUVEX to
the beacon modulator (for downlink scientific telemetry
at 1 Mbps) and to the various other connectors for up-
link command and downlink slow (technical) telemetry.
In general, this exercise showed that the design was cor-
rect and that most of the systems operated as planned;
those that did not could be reworked promptly to do
so for the subsequent integration stage.
The second and final pre-flight integration, originally
expected to take place in early-2009 for a launch before
summer 2009, was delayed to November 2009. This
integration was with the complete satellite, although
some units not related to TAUVEX were still to be
mounted. The procedure required less than four days
and could be completed in such a short time due to the
dedication of the El-Op team and the extensive and
expert help tended by the ISRO specialists. The latter
helped significantly in debugging the various problems
that appeared during the integration.
A full end-to-end test of TAUVEX and GSAT-4 was
performed at the completion of the integration. This
included moving the MDP to preset angles and measur-
ing the LOS, acquiring diffuse light images and sending
them to the EGSE through the GSAT-4 telemetry sys-
tem, etc. All these functioned perfectly, except that
whenever GSAT-4 was operated from the solar panel
simulator instead of a UPS strange patterns appeared
in the TAUVEX images and the point spread functions
of unresolved pinhole sources became excessively large.
It was clear that we had a noise pickup problem in
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the TAUVEX power supply; this was fixed by adding
a filtering stage to the TAUVEX power input at the
GSAT-4 end.
It is worth stressing that at the end of the final inte-
gration not only was TAUVEX itself ready for launch,
but also the science teams were ready for the mission
in software, mission planning and science planning. In
particular, exercises of the two teams were held to prove
the reduction pipeline, including the reconstruction of
the UV images collected by the three telescopes using
artificial event streams as well as real data collected
during the ground calibrations. A detailed mission plan
for the first flight months was also generated; it in-
cluded the space acceptance tests discussed above in
§ 5.
7 Problems with GSAT-4
Since spring 2009 rumors began to filter to the TAU-
VEX team about possible problems with the GSAT-4
mission. These were never more than word-of-mouth
statements having to do with uncertainties regarding
the capabilities of the launcher. Nevertheless, at the
completion of the final pre-launch integration stage,
performed to the satisfaction of both ISRO and El-Op
teams, the El-Op engineers and the TAUVEX scientists
were convinced that only a few more steps had to be
completed in the near future before starting to enjoy the
scientific output from TAUVEX: a final vibration and
acoustic noise test of the complete satellite including
TAUVEX, and a partial test of TAUVEX with GSAT-
4 at the launch site, prior to the satellite integration
with the GSLV vehicle. The launch was supposed to
follow promptly in January or February 2010.
In December 2009, ISRO officials contacted the
TAUVEX team and suggested that it might be ad-
visable to take TAUVEX off the satellite because of
concerns that the satellite mass was too high to al-
low a lifetime longer than 6 months in orbit. In addi-
tion, there were suggestions based on an earlier GSAT
flight that light scattered by the GSAT-4 solar panels
would adversely affect observations toward the celes-
tial poles, where the best TAUVEX data would have
come from. The TAUVEX team was not able to inde-
pendently quantify this additional contribution to the
scattered light.
During these discussions with the ISRO officials,
they mentioned a possibility to launch TAUVEX on
a small dedicated satellite that could be lofted to low
Earth orbit with a PSLV launch. This option, that
appeared to the science teams to be genuine, would es-
sentially have restored TAUVEX to its original mission
as proposed to ISA and described in § 1.
Although neither ISA nor Tel Aviv University or El-
Op ever agreed to the removal of TAUVEX from GSAT-
4, by late-January or early-February 2010 the MDP
with TAUVEX were unloaded from GSAT-4 and the
satellite was closed up for launch. TAUVEX was left
in the ISRO clean room, protected by clean anti-static
plastic sheets.
8 Launch and failure
ISRO decided to launch GSLV carrying GSAT-4 on 15
April 2010 despite the possibility that the cryogenic
upper stage of the launcher would not function prop-
erly. The launch was broadcast live and the Israeli team
viewed it in real time. About 500 seconds following ig-
nition, after the first and second stages completed their
burning, the third (cryogenic) upper stage lit up but
apparently could not sustain the burn. The rocket was
seen not accelerating, taking a nose dip, losing attitude
control, and presumably crashing into the ocean.
The TAUVEX team experienced mixed feelings. On
the one hand they grieved for the loss of the satellite
and launcher, and for the waste of so many years of hard
work by the dedicated ISRO teams. On the other hand,
they felt an obvious sense of relief that TAUVEX was
spared, remaining safe in the ISRO clean room, and ex-
pecting to fly on a future platform. However, up to the
time this paper was written, the inter-agency contacts
did not yet yield a date or a specific platform that could
loft TAUVEX to perform its intended scientific tasks.
In the meantime, TAUVEX was dismounted from the
MDP by an El-Op team and was securely stored in its
transportation container that provides an optimal stor-
age environment since it is filled with dry nitrogen. The
container with TAUVEX is stored in the ISRO clean
room in Bangalore.
Given the delay till a possible launch would become
available, it became clear to the science teams of both
nations that any flight requiring a delay longer than
one year would have to be undertaken with a TAUVEX
performing as originally planned. Since the mirrors had
been singled as the likely source of degradation, they
would have to be recoated. This, fortunately, could
be done in India and would not require reshipping the
payload to Israel, then back to India.
9 Discussion
The prolonged TAUVEX saga described above begs a
number of conclusions regarding the structure of the
TAUVEX project managed in Israel. The first deals
8with omissions by the Israeli side; it was a mistake
on the part of the science team to agree to continue
the project after the national satellite and launcher
promised by ISA in the original call for proposals
became unavailable. This naive approach, that pro-
vided no exit strategies throughout the duration of the
project, is understandable on the part of scientists, but
ultimately did not pay off.
The second mistake on the part of the TAUVEX
Principal Investigators was to allow ISA to take full
control of the budget and of the final decisions regard-
ing the conduct of the project at El-Op, while relegating
themselves to an advisory role. During the long years
of this project this caused the relaxation of the tasks
the Prime Contractor (El-Op) was required to perform,
such as the installation of contamination monitoring
devices within TAUVEX. Similarly, not insisting on a
thorough investigation of the implications of the long-
term storage of the completed TAUVEX OU was a mis-
take and the improper storage caused the throughput
reduction presumably by degrading the mirror coatings.
ISA also relaxed the requirement to maintain full doc-
umentation for the project; the conclusion is that now
there is no way to know what was done with the flight
model, when, or by whom.
On the Indian side, ISRO carries significant blame
since it entered into an agreement with ISA to launch
TAUVEX on-board GSAT-4 but was not able to fulfil
it. ISA could not enforce the launch agreements with
either RKA or ISRO because no punitive consequences
were included in the launch agreements. ISRO misled,
willingly or unwillingly, both science teams, Indian and
Israeli, as to the status of the GSLV launcher and of the
GSAT-4 satellite. The delays certainly did not help the
state of the TAUVEX mirrors and caused unnecessary
and significant expenses to the Israeli side. If the one-
year delay (2008-2009) in the integration would have
been known in advance, it is possible that El-Op would
have had time to consider refurbishing the TAUVEX
optics to recover the original response instead of keeping
TAUVEX in the clean room of ISRO.
However, one should also mention here the successes
of the project, in particular (a) the built-in flexibil-
ity of the payload that allowed a relatively easy shift
from SRG to GSAT-4, and (b) the strict adherence of
the Prime Contractor (El-Op) to the different sched-
ules imposed by the two satellites. Additionally, the
cooperation of the technical teams at both Lavotchkin
Industries in Russia and ISITE in India facilitated the
testing at various stages and the easy and efficient in-
tegration of the FM with GSAT-4.
With an eye to the future, the Indian and Israeli
science teams expect ISA and ISRO to reach an agree-
ment very soon to allow a fully-recovered TAUVEX to
be launched and perform its original mission in a timely
manner. In particular, the science team proposed to
refurbish and recoat the mirrors; this is expected to
recover the original sensitivity of TAUVEX. However,
when this paper was completed no such decision, or
indeed any decision, was announced by either ISA or
ISRO.
In the second decade of the 21st century, when the
GALEX mission is drawing to a conclusion with its
FUV channel not functioning since 2009 and UVIT on
ASTROSAT not yet launched, the science community is
in dire need of a wide-field high-sensitivity UV imaging
mission. The UV imagers on SWIFT and XMM pro-
vide only a limited capability in comparison to that of
a recovered TAUVEX. HST has exquisite UV imaging
capabilities but these are limited to very small fields.
While not useful for understanding the high-redshift
Universe (because of the redshift) or studying exoplan-
ets (angular resolution, visit cadence), TAUVEX could
easily fulfill an important role as a wide-angle UV im-
ager for the world astronomical community and bring
into play some of its special features that, so far, have
not been duplicated by other UV experiments. One
such example is the use of two of its filters, NBF-3 and
SF-2, to measure the equivalent width of the 2174Å
feature of interstellar dust (Brosch 1996). Other ex-
amples, e.g. in the field of galaxy evolution (Brosch
& Almoznino 2007) or AGN research (Netzer 2007),
abound. In addition, given that its collecting areas per
telescope are smaller that GALEX, TAUVEX could ob-
serve brighter sources than GALEX without endanger-
ing the detectors or going into non-linear detector re-
sponse. Such sources have been avoided by the GALEX
mission and are now “holes” in the UV sky (e.g., the
Magellanic Clouds).
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